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attribute changes in standard discrete choice models. For additive random
utility models, we derive expressions for the transition choice probabilities for
a change in the systematic utility. We then use these expressions to compute
the CDF’s of the compensating variation conditional on the initial and on
the ﬁnal choices. The conditional moments of the compensating variation are
obtained as a one dimensional integral of the transition choice probabilities.
We also provide a stochastic version of Shephard’s Lemma when transitions
are observed. Example of the logit and the disaggregated CES are also
studied.
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Discrete choice models (DCM) describe the individual choices of one
alternative in a set of mutually exclusive alternatives. In the standard ap 
proach adopted here, each alternative (i) is associated with a utility Ui, with
Ui = vi +εi, where vi is the systematic utility and εi is an error term known
by the individual but treated as a random variable by the modeler. The in 
dividual selects the alternative with the largest utility. The modeler assigns
a probability Pi that an individual selects alternative i. Pi is equal to the
probability that the random variable Ui is larger than all the other random
variables Uk, k  = i. This approach corresponds to the random utility models
(RUM).
Such models have initially been studied in the transport literature (to
describe the choice between private and public transportation) and in the
urban literature (to describe residential location; see the early contributions
of Domencich and McFadden [11]). Later on, RUM models have been used in
many other ﬁelds, such as education, demography, industrial organization,
public economics, experimental economics, decision theory and marketing
(see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse [3], who have discussed the neoclassical
economic foundations of RUM and developed the theory of structural mod 
els used in industrial organization; see also the survey of McFadden [14]).
Estimation of RUM (logit, probit, ordered probit, generalized extreme value
models, mixed logit, etc.) has attracted a lot of attention during the last half
century (see, e.g. the contributions of McFadden and Train [15] and Train
[18]).
RUM have been used as descriptive tools (to understand the determi 
nants of individuals choices) as well as normative tools (to study the welfare
implications and the social acceptability of a policy). The welfare proper 
ties of the RUM are well known for the simplest model, the multinomial
logit, which leads to the “logsum” formula (in the standard logit, εi are
i.i.d. double exponentially distributed and income enters the utility function
linearly with a uniform coeﬃcient, i.e. there are no income eﬀect). The ex 
tensions including income eﬀects and using other error terms speciﬁcations
are more intricate.
Small and Rosen [17] have addressed the question of income eﬀect in
RUM. They have derived an approximative expression of the expected com 
pensating variation for a price or other attribute change (they focus on taxa 
tion). They extend the conventional welfare approach to the DCM framework
1and show that the expected compensating variation can be computed as an
integral of the Hicksian choice probabilities (compensated choice probabili 
ties). Using a similar approach based on the Hicksian choice probabilities,
Dadgsvik and Karlstrom [7] derive an exact formula for the compensating
variation (CV) associated to a price (or attribute changes). More precisely,
they provide an expression for the distribution of the CV conditional on the
initial individual choices, i.e. given that the individual choices are observed
before the change.2
Welfare measures with income eﬀects have also been studied via numerical
simulations by McFadden [13], who has developed a sampler for computing
the CV caused by a change in the individual environment. For the generalized
extreme value models (or GEV), which extends the multinomial logit model,
he has provided an algorithm, the GEV sampler, to estimate welfare eﬀects.
However, even though this sampler leads to consistent results, it is time
consuming since a large number of iterations must be performed in order to
obtain with a reasonable level of accuracy numerical approximations of the
true welfare impacts.
In this paper, we wish to analyze the theoretical properties of RUM,
when a price or attribute change modiﬁes the utility of various alternatives.
First, as a consequence of the change, some individuals will alter their initial
choices. It is assumed that individual error terms remain the same before
and after the change. The expressions for the transition choice probabilities
are provided in Theorem 1.3 This information is useful per se to evaluate the
consequences of a policy since it is not suﬃcient, as it is currently the case,
to know only the choice probabilities ex ante (i.e. before the change) and/or
ex post (i.e. after the change). Moreover, the estimation of the parameters
is improved when ex ante and ex post choices are observed.4 Finally, infor 
mation on transition choice probabilities is crucial to evaluate the welfare
consequences of this change.
Second, we compute the welfare implications consecutive to this change.
More precisely, we compute the distribution of the CV for diﬀerent sets of
individuals (deﬁned by their ex ante and their ex post choices). A simple ex 
2von Haefen [19] has shown that the observed choice behavior of the individuals (i.e.
here the initial choices) improves the accuracy of the calculation of consumer surplus.
3Such expression were derived by de Palma and Kilani [9] for the special case of the
multinomial logit model.
4In this case, the likelihood function depends on the transition choice probabilities; this
problem is beyond the scope of this paper.
2ample shows that the information on the transitions leads to better estimates
of the CV than the ones obtained when only ex ante or ex post information
on individual choices are observed. This generalization of the expressions
derived by Dagsvik and Karlstrom [7] and by de Palma and Kilani [8] is
made possible by the use of a direct approach based on Marshalian transi 
tion choice probabilities. By contrast, Dagsvig and Karlstrom use Hicksian
choice probabilities relying on unobservable information, since their values
depend on the unobservable error terms εi.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we compute the
CV for a simple binary linear in income choice model and consider the im 
pacts of a change in one price. In Section 3, we provide the assumptions on
the utility functions and on the distribution of the error terms. We prove
Theorem 1 which provides an analytical formula for the transition choice
probabilities for additive random utility models (ARUM). The logit special
case is handled in Proposition 2. In Section 4, we deﬁne the CV for ARUM.
Theorem 4 provides an analytical expression (based on the transition choice
probabilities) for the distribution of the CV conditional on the transitions.
We then compute the various moments of the CV, which are given as a one 
dimensional integral either of the transition choice probabilities (Theorem
6) or of the choice probabilities (Corollary 7). We also introduce a stochas 
tic version of Shephard’s Lemma for DCM (Proposition 8) in the context
of transitions. In Section 5, utility is additive in income and error terms
are double exponentially distributed. We apply our previous results to the
special case of the logit model with no income eﬀects and verify that the
expected CV coincides with the logsum. For the disaggregated version of
the CES, we propose a new exact welfare measure. In Section 6 we discusses
further extensions.
2 Motivation
We start with a simple example and consider a DCM with two alternatives,
denoted by 1 and 2, and we study the consequences of a price change. We
show that the econometric investigator can get much better estimates of the
welfare impacts of this change, when information concerning ex ante choice
and ex post choice are used.
Assume that the ex ante utility of a given individual is Ui = αi (y − pi)+
εi, where αi > 0 is the marginal utility of income (denoted by y) of good i, pi is
3the prices of good i, and εi is an unobservable error term, i = 1,2. We assume
that the values of the error terms remain the same ex ante and ex post. For
the sake of simplicity, ex ante prices are such that: U1 − U2 = ε1 − ε2 ≡ η,
where η (also unobservable) is assumed to be uniformly distributed over
[−A,A]. Hence, good 1 is chosen ex ante if and only if η > 0 (ties are
ignored). We study the transition when the price of good 1 is raised by
∆p1 > 0.
Three cases arise: (a) if η > α1∆p1, the individual chooses 1 ex ante
and ex post (this transition is denoted 1 ֒→ 1); (b) if α1∆p1 ≥ η > 0, the
individual chooses 1 ex ante and 2 ex post (transition 1 ֒→ 2); (c) if η < 0,
the individual chooses 2 ex ante and ex post (transition 2 ֒→ 2).5
The compensating variation cv associated to this price change, deﬁned as
the solution of:






0, if η ≤ 0;
−η/α2, if 0 < η ≤ α2∆p1;
−∆p1 if α2∆p1 < η.
Let α1 ≥ α2 (larger marginal utility of income for good 1). Three cases
arise: (a) For a transition 1 ֒→ 1, we have cv = −∆p1: the individual
receives a compensation of ∆p1 and continues to stick to his original choice
1 after compensation. (b) For a transition 1 ֒→ 2, the support of cv is
[−∆p1,0]. There is a mass at (−∆p1) corresponding to the probability that
the individual shifts (after the price change) from 1 to 2, and returns to 1
after being compensated by −cv. Otherwise, the individual selects good 2
after being compensated by η/α2. (c) For a transition 2 ֒→ 2, we have cv = 0.
5The individual can stick to alternative 1 if A > α1∆p1.
6The three cases arise if A > α2∆p1. For simplicity we assume: A > max(α1,α2)∆p1.
4The discussion is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Transitions and CV with respect to η
Let α1 ≤ α2. Again three cases are envisaged: (a) For a transition 1 ֒→ 1,
cv has [−∆p1,−ρ12∆p1] as support where ρ12 ≡ α1/α2. The CV has a mass
at (−∆p1) corresponding to probability that the individual sticks to good 1
after the change, and after compensation. Otherwise, the individual shifts
to good 2 after being compensated by η/α2. (b) For transition 1 ֒→ 2, the
support of cv is [−ρ12∆p1,0]. The individual continues to select good 2 after
being compensated by η/α2. (c) For a transition 2 ֒→ 2, we have cv = 0 (see
Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Transitions and CV with respect to η
We can use the above discussion to compute the expected CV conditional
to the transition i ֒→ j, i,j = 1,2. We denote this conditional expected CV
by Ei֒→j (cv). If α1 ≥ α2, we have:
E1֒→1 (cv) = −∆p1; E1֒→2 (cv) = −(1 − ρ21/2)∆p1; E2֒→2 (cv) = 0.
5If α1 ≤ α2, we obtain:
 
E1֒→1 (cv) = −[(2A − α1ρ12∆p1 − α2∆p1)/2(A − α1∆p1)]∆p1;
E1֒→2 (cv) = −(ρ12/2)∆p1; E2֒→2 (cv) = 0.
We wish to compare the quality of the estimates of cv with respect to
the knowledge of the ex ante and/or ex post choice. We set α1 = α2 = α
(no income eﬀects). Without ex ante and/or ex post information concerning
individual’s choice, an appropriate estimate of cv is the expected CV denoted
by E (cv) and given by









First, assume that only the ex ante choice is observed. If the individual
selects 2 ex ante, cv is deterministic and equal to 0, so that the conditional
expectation denoted by E2֒→ (cv) veriﬁes: E2֒→ (cv) = 0. If the individual
selects 1 ex ante, cv is random and replaced by its conditional expectation











Second, assume that only the ex post choice is observed. If the individual
selects 1 ex post: E֒→1 (cv) = −∆p1. If the individual selects 1 ex post, we
get:
E֒→2 (cv) =










Third, assume that the ex ante and the ex post choices are observed. If 1
is selected ex ante and ex post, then cv = −∆p1; if 2 is selected ex ante and
ex post, then cv = 0. If 1 is selected ex ante and 2 is selected ex post then
cv is random and replaced by its conditional expectation denoted E1֒→2 (cv):
E1֒→2 (cv) = −∆p1/2.
In summary: the individual in 2 ex ante or in 1 ex post receive a de 
terministic compensation. By contrast, the observation of the choice of 1
ex ante only or of 2 ex post only is insuﬃcient: information on ex ante and
ex post choices (1 ֒→ 2) improves the quality of information on the CV.
6We have computed the root mean square errors σ (cv |I) for the four
estimators based on the information I on individual choice: ”without” infor 
mation, with “ex ante”, with“ex post” and with “transitions” information.
The largest gains occur when transitions are observed. When only ex post
information is available, the gain can be small. Figure 3 shows the impact of
the magnitude of the change ∆p1 for α = 1 and A = 1.
Figure 3: R.M.S.E. with four information regimes
These results suggest that the information on the ex ante and/or ex post
individual choices lead to better estimates of the CV, but that an ex ante
information only is better than ex post information only. Note that when
∆p1 = 1, there are no more transitions so that “ex ante” and “transitions”
information regimes coincide. Similarly, “without” and with “ex post” infor 
mation regimes also coincide.
3 Transition choice probabilities
There are n alternatives and preferences are described by an ARUM. We
consider the impacts of a change and study the individual choices before (ex 
ante) and after (ex post) the change. The ex ante (conditional) utility Ui of
an individual selecting i is given by Ui = vi+εi, where vi, the ex ante system 
atic component of the utility Ui of i is assumed to be observable and where
7εi is an error term, which captures unobservable individual characteristics
that are modelled by the econometric investigator as a random variable.
Let F be the CDF of the vector of error terms (ε1...εn) which is assumed
to be absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure over a
convex support. Therefore (see McFadden [12]) the probability Pi(v), that
an individual selects ex ante i can be written in an integral form7




i (u − v1...u − vn)du, (1)
where v ≡ (v1...vn) is the systematic utility vector and where: Fi (x1...xn) ≡
∂F (x1...xn)/∂xi. Note that the choice probabilities are invariant up to a
shift: Pi(v1 + δ...vn + δ) = Pi (v).8 The expected individual demand Xi for
alternative i can be obtained by using Roy’s identity (see Anderson de Palma
and Nesterov [2] and Section 5 for an illustration in the CES case).
Let Π
j
i be minus the derivative of Pi with respect to vj. A derivation of










ij (u − v1...u − vn)du, (2)




j, j  = i.9
The ex post utility of an individual selecting j is Υj = ωj +εj, where ωj
is the (observable) ex post systematic component of Υj. The probability of
selecting ex post j is given by Pj (ω), where ω ≡ (ω1...ωn) (see Eq. (1)).
7We will omit the argument of the choice probabilities and of the other functions
introduced in the sequel when it is unambiguous.
8It can be veriﬁed that:
 








Fi (u − v1...u − vn)du.
An antiderivative of
 




u→+∞F (u − v1...u − vn) − lim
u→−∞F (u − v1...u − vn) = 1.




i = −∂ [
 
i Pi]/∂vj = 0 since
 
i Pi = 1.
8The (transition) choice probability that an individual selects i ex ante
and j ex post is
Pi֒→j (v;ω) ≡ Pr(Ui > Uk,k  = i;Υj > Υr,r  = j). (3)
Theorem 1 provides an integral form for these transition choice probabilities.
Let δk ≡ Υk − Uk = ωk − vk, k = 1...n, be the utility variation10 of k.
We assume without loss of generality the ranking δ1 ≤ ... ≤ δn. Deﬁne
t+ = max(t,0). We have:
Theorem 1 For an ARUM, consider the change: v → ω. The transition







v1 + (δ1 − δi)
+ ...vn + (δn − δi)
+ 





v1 + (δ1 − z)
+ ...vn + (δn − z)
+ 
dz, if j > i;
0, if j < i.
(4)
Proof. The probability Pi֒→i (see Eq. (3)) given by
Pi֒→i = Pr(Ui > Uk,k  = i;Υi > Υr,r  = i), can be rewritten as
Pi֒→i = Pr(Ui > Uk,k  = i;Ui > Ur + (δr − δi),r  = i),
and further simpliﬁed as
Pi֒→i = Pr
 
Ui > Uk + (δk − δi)
+ ,k  = i
 
. (5)
Comparing (5) with (1), we deduce that
Pi֒→i = Pi
 
v1 + (δ1 − δi)
+...vn + (δn − δi)
+ 
.
If j  = i, with δj > δi, Pi֒→j given by (3) can be rewritten as
Pi֒→j = Pr
 
Ui > Uk +
 
δk − ζij
 +,k  = i, j;δj > ζij > δi
 
, (6)
where the random variable ζij ≡ Υj−Ui represents the utility variation after
the change.
Clearly, if i > j and therefore δi ≥ δj, then Pi֒→j = 0 as required.
10The utility variation δk is deterministic since the (additive) error terms of the utility
are assumed to be invariant after the change.
9If j > i, we associate to Ui and to Υj the variables of integration u and w,
respectively. Remark that if z ≡ w − u veriﬁes δj ≥ z ≥ δi, then u − vi =
u − vi − (δi − z)
+ and w − ωj = u − vj − (δj − z)
+. The transition choice








u − v1 − (δ1 − z)
+...u − vn − (δn − z)
+ 
dwdu.








u − v1 − (δ1 − z)
+ ...u − vn − (δn − z)
+ 
dzdu.








u − v1 − (δ1 − z)
+ ...u − vn − (δn − z)
+ 
dudz.




v1 + (δ1 − z)











v1 + (δ1 − z)
+...vn + (δn − z)
+ 
dz,
which is the required expression. ￿
The probability Pi֒→i to select i before and after the change is given by
a choice probability as deﬁned by (1). We discuss the case 1 < i < n, with
n > 2 (the other cases are left to the reader). For k < i, δk ≤ δi; therefore, if
an individual selects i (with utility vi) ex ante, he will prefer i to k ex post.
Let k > i with δk ≥ δi. In this case, an individual who selects i ex post (with
utility ωi) prefers i to k ex ante. Therefore,
Pi֒→i = Pi(v1...vi,ωi+1 − δi...ωn − δi) = Pi(v1 + δi...vi−1 + δi,ωi...ωn) (7)
represents the probability that an individual selects i ex ante and ex post.
The transition choice probabilities from i to j, j  = i are clearly zero if j
is weakly deteriorated in relative term with respect to i (δj ≤ δi). For j ≥ i,
we deﬁne the transition i ֒→ j to be feasible if it occurs with a strictly posi 
tive probability. The transition choice probabilities are explained intuitively
below. For δj > δi, these transition choice probabilities Pi֒→j are given by
10an integral on z = (ωj + εj) − (vi + εi), which represents the utility varia 
tion of an individual who shifts from i to j. Note that z > δi (the utility
variation when staying in i) and z < δj (otherwise j would have been pre 




v1 + (δ1 − z)
+ ...vn + (δn − z)
+ 
represents the probability density that the individual who experienced a util 
ity change of z shifts from i to j. Finally note that the argument z in  
v1 + (δ1 − z)
+ ...vn + (δn − z)
+ 
plays a similar role than δi in the vector  
v1 + (δ1 − δi)
+ ...vn + (δn − δi)
+ 
.
When n = 2 or 3, transition choice probabilities reduce to choice prob 
abilities (using standard constraints on probabilities). For n > 3, there are
a priori n(n − 1)/2 integrals. However, using the 2n − 3 constraints, the
computation of all transition choice probabilities requires the computation
of at most (n − 2)(n − 3)/2 integrals.
The constraints on the transition choice probabilities can be easily checked.
As expected, the ex ante and ex post choice probabilities can be recovered by
summation of the transition choice probabilities given in Theorem 1. More
precisely, using (4) it can be shown that:11
 
j
Pi֒→j = Pi (v) and
 
i
Pi֒→j = Pj (ω). (8)
Note that these expressions are straightforward to derive if one uses directly
the expressions in (3).
We consider below a simple example, where only one alternative is changed.
In this case, the transition choice probabilities can be computed and inter 
preted easily.
Example 1 (One alternative deteriorated) Assume that 1 is deterio-
rated: v → (ω1,v2...vn) with (ω1 < v1). Applying Theorem 1, the transition
choice probabilities are given by:12
P1֒ →j =
 
P1 (ω1,v2...vn), if j = 1;
Pj (ω1,v2...vn) − Pj(v), if j > 1.
11The proof is available on request
12Clearly: P1֒→1 = P1 (v1,v2 − δ1...vn − δn) = P1 (ω1,v2...vn). For z ∈ [δ1,0], we have:
(v1 + (δ1 − z)
+ ...vn + (δn − z)










j(v1 + z,v2...vn)dz = Pj (ω1,v2,...,vn) − Pj (v).
11Note that if an individual selects 1 ex-post with the systematic component of
the utility (ω1,v2...vn), he will also selected 1 ex-ante. Hence, P1 (ω1,v2...vn)
represents the probability that 1 is selected ex-ante and ex-post. Recall that the
probability that an individual selects j ex-post is Pj (ω1,v2...vn). Therefore,
Pj (ω1,v2...vn)−Pj(v) corresponds to the probability that an individual shifts
towards j, j  = 1 after the change. Note also that if j is selected ex-post
with the systematic component of the utility (ω1,v2...vn), it means that j was
selected ex-ante. As a consequence, Pj (ω1,v2...vn) − Pj(v1...vn) represents
the probability that i is chosen ex-ante and that j is selected ex-post.
Example 2 (One alternative improved) Similarly, assume that n is
improved: v → (v1...vn−1,ωn) with (ωn > vn). Using Theorem 1, we have:
Pi֒ →n =
 
Pi (v) − Pi (v1...vn−1,ωn), if i < n;
Pn (v), if i = n.
The proof and the discussion are easily adapted from the previous case.
The transition choice probabilities are explicit for the logit model. In this
case, the CDF is given by:13






















σr ≡ σ0 −
 
k≤r eωk, with σ0 ≡
 
k eωk;
 r ≡ sr + σre−δr, r = 1...n.
(11)
Proposition 2 For the logit speciﬁcation (9), consider the change: v → ω.
















σr , if j > i;
0, if j < i.
(12)
13The margins are i.i.d. according to the double exponential distribution.
12Proof. If j = i, using Eq. (7) with the logit choice probabilities (10) we
















i(v1...vr,ωr+1 − z...ωn − z)dz.
For the logit, Π
j

























since sr + σre−δr =  r and





(sr − evr+1) +
 
eωr+1−δr+1 + σre−δr+1 
=  r+1.
The remaining cases i = 1 and j = n are left to the reader. ￿
First remark that in the case of Example 1 with ω1 < v1, P1֒ →j, with















where the ﬁrst term on the RHS represents the probability that an individual
abandon 1, while the second term is the probability that j is the second best
choice (this independence results is speciﬁc to the logit).14 The other cases
are more involved and explained below.
Note that evi/ r, r ≥ i represent the probability to choose i ex ante
and to get a utility variation in [δi,δr]. The probability of this event can
14The reader is also referred to de Palma and Kilani [9] who compute the conditional
transition probabilities, where changes are conditional to the ex ante choice.
13be written as Pr
 
Ui > Uk + (δk − δr)
+ ,k  = i
 
; it corresponds to a choice
probability with the systematic utility given by (v1...vr,ωr+1 − δr...ωn − δr).
In particular, if r = i, evi/ i is the probability to have a utility variation of
exactly δi. It corresponds to Pi֒ →i since the individual sticks to alternative i
if anf only if he has a utility variation of δi.15 If the individual shifts from i
to j, the associated utility variation lies within the interval [δi,δj]. The term
evi/ r+1−evi/ r represents the probability that an individual abandon i and
have a utility variation in the interval [δr,δr+1]. He will choose an alternative
k such that k > r. The probability that he chooses j among the feasible




In the previous section, we provided an expression for the transition choice
probabilities Pi֒→j for a change v → ω. We study now the distribution of
individual compensations and the welfare impacts associated to this change.
We assume that the ex ante (ex post) indirect utility Uk (resp. Υk ) of k is a
function of the individual’s income y. They are denoted as Uk (y) (resp. as
Υk (y))16 and assumed to be strictly increasing and continuous in y.
Welfare distribution
The compensating variation cv is deﬁned as the amount of income needed
to restore the ex ante individual’s utility level after the change v → ω. In





[Υk (y − cv)]. (13)
Since the utilities are random due to the presence of the error terms (recall
Ui = vi + εi), cv is also a random variable.
In order to insure that Eq. (13) admits a unique solution, we should make
an additional assumption. Let δk (c) ≡ Υk (y − c)−Uk be the (deterministic)
utility variation of k after the change and after compensation of −c, with
δk (0) = δk. We require that for any i, k, there exists a real ψik deﬁned by:




r=i [(evi/ r+1 − evi/ r)] = evi/ j − evi/ i represents the probability
that an individual chooses i ex ante and incurs a utility variation in [δi,δj].
16We skip the argument of the utility function, when these are unnecessary.
14The interpretation of the (ψik)
′ s is provided in the following Lemma:
Lemma 3 Given a feasible transition i ֒→ j, the support of cv is included









Proof. See Appendix 1. ￿
As we have seen in Section 2, the CV conditional on the transitions i ֒→ i
can be stochastic. This is not the case in the absence of income eﬀects.
We wish to compute the distribution of cv using the information on the
individual transitions after the change: v → ω. Consider a feasible transition
i ֒→ j. The CDF of cv, conditional on a feasible transition i ֒→ j, denoted
by Φi֒→j, is given by:
Φi֒→j (c) ≡
Pr(c ≥ cv;Ui > Uk,k  = i;Υj > Υr,r  = j)
Pi֒→j (v,ω)
. (15)
In Theorem 4, an analytic expression for Φi֒→j is provided. Let δ
+
k (c) =










Theorem 4 For an ARUM, consider the change: v → ω. The CDF of
the compensating variation conditional on the transition i ֒→ j has support











, c ≥ mij, (16)
where the transition choice probabilities Pi֒→j (.,.) are given in Theorem 1.




[Υk (y − cv)] ≥ max
k
[Υk (y − c)]
 
= {Ui ≥ Υk (y − c),∀k},
using the fact that the Υk’s are strictly increasing in y and recalling the
deﬁnition of cv. For c ≥ mij ≥ ψii, we have necessarily Υi (y − ψii) = Ui ≥
Υi(y − c), so we get {c ≥ cv} = {Ui ≥ Υk (y − c),k  = i} or
{c ≥ cv} = {Ui ≥ Uk + δk (c),k  = i}.
15Hence, {c ≥ cv} = {Ui > Uk + δk (c),k  = i}, a.e., and we rewrite Eq. (15)
as:
Φi֒→j (c) =







Ui > Uk + δ
+




Comparing the numerator of Eq. (17) with Eq. (3), we deduce that it takes









→ ω. Therefore, according to Theorem 4,
we get Eq. (16).
According to Lemma 3, the support of cv conditional to transition i ֒→ j is
included in [mij,mj]. We proof here that the support is (mij,mj].








is vi while the other
components are vk + δ
+
k (c) ≥ vk, k  = i, with at least one strict inequality.
As a consequence,









so that 1 > Φi֒→j (c). Therefore, the support of cv extends up to mj.











Third, if j > i (and δj > δi), let c > mij. We have δ
+
i (c) = 0 since c > ψii
and δ
+
j (c) < δj − δi since c > ψij. As a consequence, in both cases, a






















= δj − δ
+
j (c), (18)
which implies that Φi֒→j (c) > 0. Finally, note that if mij = ψij, the previous
inequality (18) became an equality for c = ψij so that the (conditional on
i ֒→ j) distribution of cv has no jump at the lower bound of the support, i.e.
16for c = mij. Otherwise, if mij = ψii > ψij, the inequality is still strict for
c = mij = ψii, so that the distribution has no jump at this point. ￿
This expression allows the computation of the distribution of cv when
only the ex ante or the ex post choice is observed. In this case, the condi 
tional distribution of cv depends on the choice probabilities and not on the
transition choice probabilities as in Theorem 4. We now compute Φi֒→ (resp.
Φ֒→j) the conditional CDF of cv given the ex ante (resp. ex post) choice
of i (resp. j). Let mj ≡ mini (mij) and let Hmij (c) ≡ 1 if c ≥ mij and
Hmij (c) ≡ 0 otherwise be the Heaviside function at mij.
Corollary 5 For an ARUM, consider the change: v → ω. The CDF of the
compensating variation











, c ≥ ψii; (19)
















, c ≥ mj. (20)
Proof. See Appendix 2. ￿
The CDF (19) coincides with the CDF derived by Dagsvik and Karlstrom
[7] and by de Palma and Kilani [8] in the case where only the ex ante choices
are observed. Note that for the logit model, the CDF of the CV conditional







k (c), c ≥ ψii. (21)
Finally, the unconditional distribution of cv can be computed using Eq. 19
and making use of the theorem on total probability (see also Dagsvik and














17We now compute the conditional to the ex ante and/or ex post choice as
well as the unconditional moments of the distribution of cv.
Theorem 6 For an ARUM, consider the change: v → ω. The pth moment



















Proof. For 0 ≤ π ≤ 1, deﬁne the conditional quantile function Φ
−1
i֒→j (π) ≡
sup{c ∈ [mij,mj]|π ≥ Φi֒→j (c)}, which is the inverse of the conditional CDF






 p dπ. For c ∈ [mij,mj], the function Φi֒→j (c) is continuous
and monotonic. It is therefore a.e. diﬀerentiable according to the Lebesgue
theorem (cf. Rudin [16]). As a consequence, a PDF φi֒→j can a.e. be
deﬁned. Using the change of variable: π = Φi֒→j (c), with c ∈ [mij,mj], we




mij zpφi֒→j (c)dc. Then using an integration




mij cp−1Φi֒→j (c)dc. This general
property can be used for the ARUM speciﬁcation where Φi֒→j (.) is given by
(16) and leads to the required result (22). ￿
When p = 1, Eq. (22) provides the expected CV conditional on the
observed transitions. This is reminiscent of the standard treatment of sur 
plus, and involves the computation of areas under the compensated transition
choice probabilities curves.
Corollary 7 For an ARUM, consider the change: v → ω. The pth (p ≥ 1)
moment of the compensating variation conditional is given for






































18Proof. Use the same technique as for the proof of Theorem 6 by considering
Φi֒→ given by (19) instead of Φi֒→j or by considering Φ֒→j given by (20) instead
of Φi֒→j. ￿
Equation (23) with p = 1 coincides with the expected CV conditional on
the ex ante choice derived by Dagsvik and Karlstrom [7] and by de Palma
and Kilani [8]). In this case, areas under the compensated choice probability
curves are required. Equation (24) is new and relies on the expressions
obtained in Theorem 6.




















In particular, the expectation of cv is given by























. An approximative expres 
sion for the expected CV was previously envisaged by Small and Rosen [17].
Shephard’s lemma
We assume that the systematic component of the utility (ex ante and ex 
post) of k depends on income y and on price level pk and is given by Vk (y,pk).
Assuming that Vk (.,.) is diﬀerentiable with respect to both arguments, the
conditional (individual) demand xk for good k is determined by using Roy’s
identity: xk = −(∂Vk/∂pk)/(∂Vk/∂y), k = 1...n. Note that in ARUM,
the conditional demands are deterministic, i.e. are independent on the error
terms. Let ∆pk be a price change of good k. The corresponding CV for an
individual who sticks to good k is ψkk. Shephard’s Lemma, which is a direct
application of the Envelope Theorem, gives: lim∆pk→0 ψkk/∆pk = −xk.
In the RUM approach, when an individual modify her choice after an
inﬁnitesimal price change, the corresponding CV is stochastic (i.e. depends
on the error terms of the initial and of the ﬁnal good). Therefore, we com 
pute the expected CV, conditional of the transition in order to write the
counterpart of Shephard’s Lemma in the RUM models. We have:
19Proposition 8 For an ARUM, consider the inﬁnitesimal change of the price
of one good. The expected change in CV per dollar for an inﬁnitesimal price









−x1, if j = 1;
−
ρ1j







x1 if j > 1, ρj1 ≤ 1,
(27)
where ρij ≡ (∂Vi/∂y)/(∂Vj/∂y).
The expected change in CV per dollar for an inﬁnitesimal price decrease of








2xn, if i < n;
−xn, if i = n. (28)
Proof. See Appendix 3. ￿
To illustrate Proposition 8, consider a price increase. The result for the
case if j = 1 is trivial, since this is Sheppard’s Lemma. The intuition for the
case if j > 1 is more subtle. First note that the consumer who is indiﬀerent
between 1 and j (i.e. the ﬁrst individual to shift) requires no compensa 
tion. Second, consider the “last” individual ready to shift from 1 to j, i.e.
indiﬀerent between state 1 and state j. The indiﬀerence ex post implies that:
v1(p1 + ∆p1,y) + ε1 = vj(pj,y) + εj.
Since ∆p1 → 0, we have: εj −ε1 = v1+∆p1 (∂V1/∂p1)−vj (where argument
are omitted when unnecessary). The CV gives:
v1(p1,y) + ε1 = vj(pj,y − cv) + εj.
Since cv → 0 as ∆p1 → 0, v1 +ε1 = vj −cv (∂Vj/∂y)+εj, so that, using the
expression for εj − ε1 derived above, we get:
cv =













20Therefore, the average (per dollar) CV is given, as required, by: −x1ρ1j/2.
Finally, note that by applying the theorem on total probability to (27) and
(28), one obtains: lim∆p1→0+ E [cv]/∆p1 = X1 and lim∆pn→0− E [cv]/∆pn =
Xn, respectively. Recall that Xi, i = 1...n, represents the expected individual
demand for good i. This weaker version of the Shephard’s has been obtained
by Dagsvik and Kalstrom [7] and by de Palma and Kilani [8].
5 Additive in Income logit speciﬁcation
In this section, we concentrate our attention on the logit model, where the
transition choice probabilities have an explicit form (see Proposition 2). We
assume that the utility is additive in income, i.e. that Uk − v (y) (resp.
Υk −v (y)) is independent on income, where v (.) is strictly increasing. Note
that we consider the case where v(.) is independent from the alternatives.
We ﬁrst provide the expressions for the CDF of CV’s conditional on the
transition i ֒→ j. They have closed forms given by:
Proposition 9 For the logit speciﬁcation (9) with additive in income utility,
consider the change: v → ω. The compensating variation conditional on the








, j > l ≥ i,






















r+1 −  −1
r
 
, l > i, with sr, σr and  r
given by (11).
Proof. We have: δk (c) = δk − δy (c), where δy (c) ≡ v (y) − v (y − c) is
strictly increasing in c. The ψ
′





y (δk), if k < i;
δ
−1
y (δi), if k ≥ i.
Note that ψik ≤ ψii since δ
−1
y is increasing and since δk ≤ δi for k ≤ i.
Therefore, the support of the distribution of cv conditional on the transition




, since ψij = ψii = δ
−1
y (δi) = mij and since
mj = δ
−1





, then v + δ
+(c) = (v1...vl,ωl+1 − δy (c)...ωn − δy (c))





= (δ1...δi...δl,δy (c)...δy (c)). Therefore, we have the

















 rl (c) =
 
 r, if r ≤ l;
sl + σle−δy(c), if r > l.




















Using the fact that Pi֒→j (v) = evieωjΞij, j > i, we get Eq. (29). ￿
The expected CV’s conditional on the transition i ֒→ j can be computed
up to (n − 1) integral terms:
Proposition 10 For the additive in income logit, consider the change: v →
ω. The expected compensating variation conditional on the transition i ֒→ j,
j > i, is given by:
Ei֒→j [cv] =
 











 r − θr
 








r+1 −  −1
r
 





sr + σre−δy(c), r = 1...n − 1, (31)
with sr, σr and  r given by (11).
Proof. See Appendix 4. ￿
The formula (30) with (31) generalizes the standard logsum expression
(discussed below) in many ways. It conditions the expected CV on both the
ex ante and the ex post choices and it captures income eﬀects.
Using the same integral terms θr (r = 1...n − 1), it is possible to derive
expressions of the expected CV when the ex ante or the ex post (Corollary
11) are observed. We have:
22Corollary 11 For the additive in income logit, consider the change: v → ω.
The expected compensating variation conditional on





r=i θr, if i < n;
ψnn, if i = n;
(32)
(b) the ex-post choice of j is:
E֒→j [cv] =
 













, if j > 1, (33)
with sr, σr and  r given by (11).












sn/ i, if j = i;
sneωjΞij, if j > i. (35)



























































23It can be readily be shown that this expression is equivalent to Eq. (32).
Finally, if i = n, clearly we have En֒→[cv] = ψnn.
(b) See Appendix 5. ￿
Given that E[cv] =
 n
i=1 Pi (v)Ei֒→[cv], we get that for the additive in
income logit, the expected CV is:17




Assume for example that for all initial choice, the individual has beneﬁted
from the change. In this case, ψnn is the maximal beneﬁt induced by this
change. This beneﬁt has to be reduced to take into account that the indi 
vidual with another ex ante choice requires a smaller compensation.
Proposition 10, Corollary 11 and Eq. (36) show that the conditional and
the unconditional CV’s can be obtained from the same set of values θr. When
income is additive and linear or logarithmic, there exists an explicit formula
for the θ
′
rs that will be exploited below.
Applying the Theorem
We consider below the two well known logit and CES speciﬁcations:
Example 3 (The linear in income logit) If v(y) = (1/ )y, with   > 0,
we have δy (c) = (1/ )c and ψkk =  δk. We get the following explicit
expression of the integral term
θr =  
 
δr+1 − δr + ln r+1 − ln r
sr
 
, r = 1...n − 1.
Using these expression of θr in (36) leads to the following formula for the
unconditional expected CV:









This expression (37) corresponds to the diﬀerence between the ex post
and ex ante logsums. The well known logsum formula has been intuitively
derived by Ben Akiva [4] and formalized by McFadden [12]) as a welfare




r=i eviθr. Eq. (36) is obtained by
inverting the two sum signs.
24measure. It is widely used in many application of the linear in income multi 
nomial logit model. The formula for the conditional CV’s (see Proposition
10 and Corollary 11) are explicit in this case. Our analysis allows to compute
conditional logsums which provide more accurate evaluation of surplus when
ex ante and/or ex post choices are observed (see the numerical illustrations
provided in Section 2).
When the utility is additive but non linear in income, as for the CES
model, we can still derive an explicit formula for the expected CV’s:
Example 4 (The logarithmic in income logit) If v(y) = (1/ )lny,
with   > 0, we have δy (c) = −(1/ )ln(1 − c/y) and ψkk = y
 
1 − e− δk 
.
The integral term in this case is given by18







 r , sr
 r+1 (1 −  , ), r = 1...n − 1,
where B denotes the generalized incomplete Beta function19. The expected














 r , sr
 r+1 (1 −  , )
 
. (38)
Assume for example that the systematic component of the utility has the
following speciﬁcation: vk = (1/ )(lny − lnpk) where pk denotes the ex ante
price of good k. Using the Roy’s identity, the (ex ante) expected demand for









Anderson et al. [1] have shown that the CES representative consumer
model (see Dixit and Stiglitz [10]) can be derived as a logit model with in 
come additive logarithmic speciﬁcation and double exponentially distributed
error terms. We provide below an expression for the conditional (and un 
conditional) CV corresponding to the CES. Anderson et al. [3] (pp. 97 100)
show that “a rise in the CES indirect utility function does not necessarily im 
ply that all constituent consumers (...) can be made better oﬀ by appropriate
redistribution of income.” This criticism of the representative consumer can
be handled when the CV is ﬁrst computed at the individual level and then
18Use the change of variable t = sr/
 
sr + σr (1 − c/y)
1/  
.
19Recall that the generalized incomplete Beta function is given by: Bz0,z1 (a,b) ≡   z1
z0 ta−1 (1 − t)
b−1 dt, where a,b ∈ R and z0,z1 ∈ ]0,1[.
25aggregated over the population. We provide this result below. Consider a
change in prices (p1...pn) → (ρ1...ρn), where ρk is the ex post price of good
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the partial ex ante and the ex post CES price indices, and where in this case















 −1/  −1
.
(40)
These expressions diﬀer from the aggregate standard welfare measures of
the CES model. They provide alternative welfare measure to assess the
policy implication of price changes. These disaggregated measures can be
easily aggregated and challenge the existing standard aggregate CES welfare
measures used in various applications in economics. Further extensions are
discussed in the next section.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have presented a ﬁrst step towards a dynamic choice model,
where individuals alter their current choice after a change in the attributes
of the alternatives. For ARUM, we have computed the transition choice
probabilities and the associated welfare measures (CV) and have provided
analytical functional forms. Using these formulae will ease the econometric
and the welfare analysis both at the theoretical and empirical levels. Theses
applications reamain unexplored till now.
The proposed framework can be extended in several directions. The most
important extension involves the mixed logit model, widely used in empir 
ical applications (see Berry et al. [5], [6], McFadden and Train [15], and
Train [18]). In this case, some parameters entering the systematic utility are
distributed so that the transition choice probabilities will involve a kernel
that have been computed in Section 3, while the various welfare measures
26(conditional and unconditional distribution and moments of CV) will involve
explicit kernels provided in Section 5. In this sense, the mixed logit would
only add an integral for each parameter that is being distributed.
We have concentrated our analysis on the case where only one series of
change occur at once, and individual choices are observed ex ante and ex 
post (i.e. before and after this change). Moreover, we have assumed that the
error terms remain the same, and this is not necessary the case in a truly
dynamic model. It is easy to consider situations, and model situations where
individuals have some probability to inherit a new error term (for some or
all alternatives) when a change has occurred. Besides, practical situations
may involve several changes staggered over time. In this case, the exact
dynamics of the error term is relevant. Indeed, without ﬁxed error terms,
each change induces transitions which provide information on the parameters
of the systematic utility as well as on the value of the error terms. As a
consequence the model may lead to inconsistent sequence of choice if the
error terms are individual speciﬁc. The redraw of the error terms avoid to
avoid these inconsistent series of choices. There is still have a long way to
compute exact formulae for truly dynamic random utility models. We hope
that this paper provides a useful ﬁrst step in this direction.
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27Appendix
1 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. First note that ψii restores the utility of i to its ex ante level Ui,
since Υi(y − ψii) = δi(ψii) + Ui = Ui.
For a transition i ֒→ i, we have Ui ≥ Uk + (δk − δi)
+ (see (5)). As a con 
sequence, since Υk (y − c) = Uk + δk (c), then ψik (which solves δk (ψik) =
(δk − δi)
+) is the largest amount needed to restore the utility of alternative k
to the ex ante level Ui. As a consequence, ψii = mi ≤ cv ≤ maxk (ψik) = Mi.









= 0) are respectively
the lowest and the largest amount needed to restore the utility of alternative j




 + ≤ Ui, where ξij ≡ Υj−Ui (see (6)). Since δj ≥ ξij ≥ δi,




= (δk − δj)
+) is the largest amount needed to re 












Since δi ≤ δj, we have that ψji = ψii, we get: mij ≤ cv ≤ mj. ￿
2 Proof of Corollary 5
Proof. (a) Using Theorem 4, for feasible transitions, we have mij ≥ ψii.




= (δk − δj)
+, and since δk (c) is decreasing





m1 ≤ ... ≤ mn.
Since δk (ψnk) = (δk − δn)
+ = 0, we have ψnk = ψkk so that mn = maxk (ψkk).
Therefore, the support of cv conditional to the ex ante choice of i is [ψii,mn].













where Fi֒→ stands for the set of alternatives j such that i ֒→ j is feasible. For



















= δj − δ
+
j (c),
































Then, using Eq. (8), we get Eq. (19).
(b) According to Theorem 4, the support of cv conditional to the ex post




where Fj is the set of alternatives i such
that i ֒→ j is feasible. For non feasible transitions verifying δi ≥ δj, we
have ψij = ψjj and therefore that mij ≥ ψjj = mjj. As a consequence,





For c ≥ mj, using Theorem 4, we get that
Φ֒→j (c) =
 










The sum can be extended to non feasible transitions i ֒→ j to get Eq. (20).





= (δj − δi)









is vi and its jth component is vj so that for  
v1 + δ
+















3 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Recall that (see Eq. (22)):














, j = 1...n, and








= (δk − δj)
+ , k = 1...n,
(see Eq. (14)).
Note that ψ11 < 0 since δ1 < 0. The Roy’s Identity applied in the deter 
ministic case leads to: lim∆p1→0+ (ψ11/∆p1) = −x1. Moreover, since δk = 0,
k = 2...n, we have: δk (ψ1k) = (0 − δ1)
+ = −δ1, k = 2...n. Accordingly,
ψ1k < 0, k = 2...n, and limδ1→0− (ψ1k/δ1) = (∂Vk/∂y)
−1. Therefore, using







= −x1ρ1k,k = 1...n.
Therefore: lim∆p1→0+ (m1/∆p1) = −mink (ρ1k)x1. Now, since I1 (δ1,c) is
continuous in c, using the mean value theorem for integration, we get
E1֒→1 [cv] = m1 −
(m1 − ψ11)I1 (δ1,  c1)
P1֒→1 (v;ω1,v2...vn)
,
where   c1 ∈ (ψ11,m1). Now using the fact that lim∆p1→0+ I1 (δ1,  c1) = I1 (0,0)


























= 0) and ψjk = 0,







Using Eq. (4) and applying the mean value theorem for integration we get:







v1,v2 −  δ...vn −  δ
 ,








v1,v2 + (−δ2 (c) − z)
+ ...vn + (−δn(c) − z)
+ 
dz.
30Let ε > 0 small enough. Since the integrand tends towards Π
j
1 as δ1 and z
tend towards zero, we can ﬁnd δ1 and c arbitrarily small in order that


































where R veriﬁes |R| ≤ Mc2 with M a positive constant. Therefore, by











































−1 , if ρ1j ≤ 1;
(∂V1/∂y)
−1 , if ρj1 ≤ 1.
. (44)



































x1, if ρj1 ≤ 1.
Now, recall that (see Eq. (22)):














, j = 1...n,
and where mn = maxk (ψnk), with ψnk solving δk (ψnk) = (δk − δn)
+, k =
1...n, (see Eq. (14)). Since δk ≤ δn, then ψnk is solving δk (ψnk) = 0, k =
311...n, (see Eq. (14)). Therefore, ψnk = 0, k = 1...n − 1 and ψnn > 0. There 
fore, mn = maxk (ψnk) = ψnn. Moreover, we have: min = max(ψii,ψin) =
max(0,ψin), i = 1...n − 1, where ψin is solving δn(ψin) = (δn − δi)
+ = δn.






i (v1...,vn−1,ωn − z)dz =
(δn − δn (c))Π
n
i (v1...,vn−1,ωn −   z),
where   z ∈ (0,δn − δn (c)). Using the fact that Πn
i (v1...,vn−1,ωn −   z) tends
towards Πn















































Now, since En֒→n [cv] = ψnn, we have lim∆pn→0− (En֒→n[cv]/∆pn) = −xn. ￿
4 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. Clearly, for a transition i ֒→ i, we have Ei֒→i [cv] = ψii. For a feasible
transition i ֒→ j, with j > i, using Theorem (6) with p = 1, we get




which can be rewritten as:






Using (46) and (29), we get:


















32which can be rewritten as:

































r+1 −  −1
r
 
and inverting the sign
sums we get




































which can be simpliﬁed as:















































































































which is equivalent to Eq. (30). ￿
335 Proof of Corollary 11 (b)
Proof. If i = 1 clearly we have E֒→1 [cv] = ψ11.












σ0e−δj/ j, if i = j;
σ0eviΞij, if i < j; (48)
From (48) and (30) we get:





















Inverting the two sum signs we obtain





















which can be simpliﬁed as



















This expression can be rewritten as





















Noting that σrsr−σrsr = −eωr r, that s1/σ1 1 = eω1/σ0σ1 and that sj−1+
e−δjσj−1 =  j, we obtain the required expression (33). ￿
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